

VZCZCXRO6470
PP RUEHBZ RUEH DU RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHTRO
DE RUEHDS #0355/01 0401624
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 091624Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3717
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0505
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 3258
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0914
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 7724
RUZEFAA/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ADDIS ABABA 000355

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/FO, AF/RSA, AF/SPG, AND NEA/ELA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/09/2019

TAGS: [PREL](#) [PGOV](#) [SU](#) [EG](#) [AU](#) [CD](#) [XA](#)

SUBJECT: AU SUMMIT -- AF ACTING A/S CARTER MEETS WITH
EGYPTIAN ASSISTANT MINISTER

REF: ADDIS 267

Classified By: AMBASSADOR DONALD YAMAMOTO, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).

[11](#). (U) Action request for Embassy Cairo -- see paragraph 10.

[12](#). (C) Summary: AF Acting Assistant Secretary Phillip Carter met February 2 with Egyptian Assistant Minister for Africa Mona Omar Atteya on the margins of the African Union Summit. Carter asked Atteya to pressure Sudan to pause in military action against the South Darfur town of Muhajariya. Atteya sympathized with the urgency of the situation but linked the problems to the International Criminal Court pending arrest warrant against President Bashir. Carter said the United States had not changed its position that it would veto any UNSC resolution to defer an ICC indictment. End Summary.

[13](#). (C) Carter explained to Atteya the situation regarding the South Darfur town of Muhajariya, which was occupied by Justice and Equality Movement rebel forces two weeks ago and which Government of Sudan forces announced a 24 hour notice before beginning bombing. There are 159 Nigerian UNAMID troops in town who have been ordered by UNAMID headquarters to hold their ground. They are protecting a large number of internally displaced persons. The GOS has announced that it will begin intensive bombing of the town to dislodge the rebels. The United States has intervened both with JEM and GOS to take a pause in the fighting and travel directly to Doha to begin negotiations. Carter said he met with GOS Presidential Advisers Nafie Ali Nafie and Mustafa Ismael the previous evening (see reftel), who had told him that they would continue to press military action while agreeing to negotiate.

[14](#). (C) Carter noted that Egypt has good channels of communication with Sudan, and he looked to Atteya for support. Atteya said it is a question of national security. The situation on the ground is very complex, and the international community should join hands to avoid the potentially significant loss of life. She noted that the GOS's position is significantly weakened, and the International Criminal Court's (ICC) imminent arrest warrant of President Bashir is likely to complicate matters. Atteya asked if the United States would consider supporting a UNSC Article XVI deferral of the ICC indictment.

[15](#). (C) Carter said the GOS should agree to a pause in its military operations and show more cooperation in other areas for its own good, regardless of the ICC indictment. Carter said he told AU Commissioner Ping, Peace and Security Commissioner Lamamra, and the GOS that the United States had

not changed its opposition to a deferral of the ICC arrest warrant. Sudan needs to move forward with clear and measurable actions. On the contrary, the humanitarian situation has deteriorated as a result of GOS action or inaction since July 14, 2008, when the ICC indictment was first announced. The entire GOS, not just President Bashir, has the responsibility to do something.

¶16. (C) Atteya said there has been lots of progress in the last five years and remaining problems are not just the fault of the GOS. She said she understands the rhythm is slow and the GOS are masters of the missed opportunity. The role of the United States is crucial. Atteya said the GOS has been telling her they are doing everything they can and it is never enough. She had heard there had been a sharp exchange between UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon and President Bashir the previous day, which Carter confirmed having heard a similar report. Atteya said they need more time to formulate a strategy and you do not want to push them against a wall.

¶17. (C) Carter said there is no quid pro quo. The GOS has had time to make changes in its policy and has not done so. The ICC verdict will not change the fact that the GOS has to cooperate more, and GOS officials have to be encouraged to help themselves. Carter said he appreciates the good working relationship with Egypt.

¶18. (C) Atteya agreed. She noted that she had accompanied President Mubarak to Egypt's New Partnership for Africa's Development Workshop and Peer Review Mechanism. She had also just attended a peer review of the government of Benin, and

ADDIS ABAB 00000355 002 OF 002

had been impressed by the very frank assessment of corruption in that country. She said: "The discussion was amazing. Africa is really changing."

¶19. (C) Comment: Atteya's relatively unsympathetic reaction and focus on the ICC verdict is inconsistent with the tone coming from Egyptian officials in Washington (including Ambassador Shoukry) when State officials discussed Sudan topics, particularly Article XVI. It is also at odds with the statements made by Sudanese Foreign Minister Deng Alor regarding how President Mubarak has reached out to the Sudan People's Liberation Movement and no longer defends the Government of Sudan (Addis 0269). End Comment.

¶10. (C) Action Request for Embassy Cairo: Given the apparent discrepancies, Washington would appreciate it if post could approach Egyptian officials to clarify Egypt's position on Sudan.

¶11. (U) Acting A/S Carter has approved this message.
YAMAMOTO